Certificates And Receipts

MAL proof bundles are hash artifacts. They are useful for audit, but they are not trusted execution environment attestations.

Proof Bundle

When a plan sets requireProof: true, the interpreter accumulates:

Field	Meaning
`planHash`	Hash of the canonical plan before execution.
`steps[]`	Per-step input hash, output hash, op, success flag, and optional inference run ids.
`inferenceRunIds[]`	Run ids surfaced by subagent/tool execution.
`sandbox`	Optional Daytona metadata when isolation is active.
`proofCid`	Pinata CID when pinning succeeds.

The pinned bundle schema version is compose.proof.v1.

Honest Trust Model

Claim	Status
Step inputs and outputs can be hash-checked against the bundle.	Yes.
The bundle can point to inference run ids for cross-checking receipts.	Yes.
Pinata can store the proof bundle CID.	Yes, when `PINATA_JWT` is configured.
The runtime emits a live EVM signature in this module.	No. `signProofBundle()` is a placeholder.
Daytona proves TEE-grade execution.	No. The sandbox path is isolation, not TEE attestation.

Receipts

x402 receipts belong to the API and inference layers. Harness proof bundles can reference inference run ids; verifiers should cross-check those ids against Compose/x402 receipts rather than treating the proof bundle as payment authority.

Sandboxing Checkpoints

Overview

Memory

Harness

Tools

Proof Bundle

Honest Trust Model

Receipts

​Proof Bundle

​Honest Trust Model

​Receipts

​Related

Proof Bundle

Honest Trust Model

Receipts

Related